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INTRODUCTION: The current food crisis in Southern
Africa has lead to an urgent concern about how to make
food affordable to low income consumers in both rural
and urban areas when crops fail and local prices surge.
We suggest in this policy synthesis that the more
fundamental question is how to make markets work to
provide more food security options for the poor in both
surplus and deficit years.  Policies that facilitate regular
availability of low-cost staple foods to poor consumers
during good harvest years will also increase the ability
of markets to contribute to food security objectives
during crises.  The poor are always at risk of food
insecurity, and markets always have a major impact on
their ability to meet their food needs.  Even during
surplus years, rural net buyers (and urban consumers)
depend on markets for some portion of their food needs.
Likewise, even during periods of national food
shortfalls, most rural and urban poor rely more on
markets than on emergency distributions to secure their
residual food needs. 
Well designed targeted food assistance programs can be
crucial to maintaining food security during crises.  Yet
the cost and logistical difficulties of such programs can
become prohibitive if markets do not function
effectively to move food to consumers with effective
demand.  Thus, a comprehensive food security strategy
in southern Africa requires that maize grain and meal,
and other food staples such as cassava or rice, are
accessible at affordable prices to consumers through the
market.
OBJECTIVES:  The purpose of this policy synthesis
is to examine the role of low-cost food staples, such as
maize grain and mugaiwa,
1 and the small-scale trading
and milling sectors that provide them, in ensuring poor
consumers’ access to affordable food.
2  We focus on
this marketing season’s maize deficit in Zambia, and on
current and past experience in Mozambique. We then
identify opportunities for governments and the private
sector to increase access to affordable food among rural
and urban consumers on a regular basis, with especially
high payoffs during crises.
BACKGROUND:  The high proportion of households
in 2002/03 in both countries that have been unable to
cover their maize deficit through purchases confirms
the serious nature of the current food crisis in southern
1 Mugaiwa, also known as “straight-run” maize meal, is produced
by milling maize grain through a hammer mill, using a sieve
setting that produces no by-product.
2  Though maize is the most important staple in both rural and
urban diets in most of Mozambique, rice (most of it imported) is
much more important there, especially in urban diets, than it is in
Zambia.  Cassava is also very important in rural diets.  However,
for ease of exposition across countries, we focus this paper on
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Figure 1.  Breakfast, Roller Meal and Mugaiwa Prices in Lusaka (real Kwacha/kg,
May 2002=100)
parts of Zambia and Mozambique.  In Eastern,
Southern, and Western provinces of Zambia, an
estimated 210,000 households required food relief.  Yet
an estimated 140,000 rural maize deficit households
had the purchasing power to buy their maize
requirements. In Mozambique, 650,000 primarily rural
people require assistance in the southern provinces of
Maputo, Gaza, and Inhambane, meaning that about
2.5m in these same provinces have been able to meet
their needs through some combination of own
production and market purchases (total rural population
in these provinces is about 3.2m).  To reduce the burden
of drought relief programs, markets need to function
well so that households with some purchasing power
can purchase as much grain as possible with their
income. 
We suggest that the informal marketing and small-scale
maize milling sectors play important roles in this
regard, for four reasons:
1. Maize grain – the cheapest staple aside from
manioc – is available to rural and urban consumers
predominantly through informal markets.  Purchasing
grain, then either hand-pounding it or milling it in a
local hammer mill, allows the poorest households with
the lowest opportunity cost of time to maximize the
amount of food they can obtain with their limited
budgets.
2. Ready-made mugaiwa is available almost
exclusively in informal markets, and is generally much
cheaper than refined meals.
3. Mugaiwa has a higher nutritional content than
refined meals.
4. The hammer milling sector in both countries has
substantial milling capacity, which is probably
underutilized during significant portions of each year.
In the next sections we touch on these issues with
evidence from Zambia and Mozambique, and discuss
key policy challenges to ensure regular availability of
these products to low income consumers.
FINDINGS: Maize grain and the mugaiwa that is
produced from it are substantially cheaper than
refined meals, but government policy can undermine
the ability of informal markets to make these low
cost staples regularly available in markets.  
Figures 1 and 2 show retail prices of white maize
products in Lusaka and Maputo, respectively, from
1994 to the present.  An important pattern immediately
emerges in the Zambia data.  Due to lower marketing 
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Figure 2.  Prices of White Maize Grain and Meals in Maputo, May 1994 –
February 2003 (US$/kg)
and processing costs, mugaiwa
prices
3 should normally be well
below prices of breakfast and
roller meal.  This expected
pattern prevails most of each
marketing year, during harvest
and post-harvest seasons.  Yet
near the end of the marketing
year,  computed mugaiwa prices
typically rise to equal and
sometimes exceed those of the
more refined meals.  This regular
seasonal price spike in computed
mugaiwa prices is due to the
scarcity of maize grain in the
small/medium-scale trading and
public market distribution
channels at the end of each marketing season, and
means that the lowest income consumers face
substantial increases in the cost of their food basket at
this time of the year – more than they would if maize
grain continued to be available to them.  
Part of this seasonal scarcity of maize grain in public
markets is likely due to dwindling supplies at the farm
level, and limited ability of small traders to store grain
into the lean season.  Large millers, on the other hand,
may have more financial capacity to store, or to import
large quantities of grain if needed.  
Yet experience of the past two years shows that
government import policy exacerbates this pattern when
it imports grain itself and channels it preferentially or
exclusively to the large milling sector.  This occurred in
2001/02, after government facilitated the importation of
approximately 150,000 MT of maize, and channeled it
exclusively through industrial mills.  Low-income
consumers were forced to pay a higher price  for their
maize  meal  than  would  have  been  the  case if some
imported grain were made available to small traders and
consumers.  
Government has not imported any significant amount of
grain in 2002/03.  Yet prices of grain in public markets
are nearly as high as those of industrially milled meal.
This price pattern suggests that the majority of formal
and informal imports by the private sector from
Tanzania, Mozambique, and South Africa have been
made by, or have ended up with, large traders and
millers.  Little of this grain entered the informal
markets, the only source by which consumers and small
traders could purchase maize to mill into mugaiwa.
This has  especially jeopardized poor urban and rural
consumers’ access to food, as will be shown.
Table 1 illustrates the cost savings of the mugaiwa
option for a low-income household in Lusaka (earning
roughly 68,000 kwacha per month)
4 when maize is not
scarce in public markets.  The table assumes that the
household purchases 42 kg of maize meal each month,
and then shows the cost difference of purchasing maize
and taking it to a hammer mill to obtain mugaiwa,
rather than purchasing the same volume of breakfast or
roller meal. Compared to purchasing breakfast meal, the
3 Mugaiwa prices in Zambia were computed using maize grain
public market retail prices, and adding hammer milling fees
(Source: AMIC and CSO). It was assumed that the mugaiwa
extraction rate is 100%.  Prices in Mozambique are actual market
prices of mugaiwa.
4 About 25% of urban households are estimated to have less than
this monthly income and 75% are estimated to have more,
according to LCMS estimates, reflated to 2002 price levels.FSII Policy Synthesis No. 66
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cost saving of the mugaiwa option is
20% of the household’s monthly
income.  The household’s remaining
income after purchasing breakfast meal
would have been around ZK 18,000,
whereas the remaining income after
purchasing mugaiwa would be ZK
32,000.
In Mozambique, maize grain and
imported refined meal have been the
most consistently available products. 
Mugaiwa was consistently available in
Maputo retail markets – and was
substantially cheaper than refined
meals  – until early 2002, when it
disappeared   from  the  city’s informal
markets. Domestic refined meal has
been regularly available since early
1997.  Over this time, the price
difference between domestic refined
meal and mugaiwa has steadily fallen,
from an average of US$0.08/kg during 1997 (or about
20% of the refined meal price) to about US$0.04/kg in
2001 (15%).  Over the same period, the price difference
between grain and domestic refined meal has fallen
from over US$0.17/kg to under US$0.11/kg.
As Figure 2 shows, a distinguishing characteristic of
markets in southern Mozambique throughout the 1990s
was the regular availability of maize grain and
affordable mugaiwa in retail markets.  Since May 2002,
however, mugaiwa has been almost entirely absent from
most southern markets, while continuing to be regularly
available in most markets of the center and north of the
country.  Traders have indicated in interviews that the
informal sector no longer imports maize grain from
South Africa for southern markets, though it does
continue to bring surplus production from the center to
the south.  
The reasons for these developments – absence of
mugaiwa and termination of informal imports of grain
from South Africa – are not yet fully understood.  It is
known, however, that the Government of Mozambique
began to charge a 17% value-added tax on maize grain
imports in 2000.  Formal sector importers who process
the grain into flour or animal feed are entitled to
reimbursement of the VAT and have, after initial
bureaucratic difficulties, been successful in obtaining
that reimbursement.  Informal importers  who do not
process the grain – the standard practice in the informal
sector – are not entitled to any reimbursement.  We
hypothesize here that this unequal incidence of the tax,
combined with lower unit procurement costs for formal
importers producing refined meals, has undercut the
ability of the informal sector to make whole meals
available at prices sufficiently low to compete with
refined meals.  Research is currently underway to test
this hypothesis.
The poorest consumers switch to mugaiwa when
they have relatively modest price discounts
compared to refined meals. Urban consumer research
in Mozambique shows that the poorest consumers
switch to mugaiwa when these have relatively modest
price discounts compared to refined meals (Table 2).  
Table 1. Comparison Between Savings  Derived from Mugaiwa Consumption 
and Industrially Milled Mealie Meal
Breakfast Roller Mugaiwa
Price per kg (ZK, 2001/2002 avg.) 1,184.74 975.64 855.07
Average household’s consumption (kg) 42 42 42
Monthly expenditure on mealie meal (ZK) 49,759 40,977 35,913
Difference in expenditure between
mugaiwa and other types of meal (ZK)
13,846 5,064 -
Real income of Lusaka low-income
household (ZK)
68,182 68,182 68,182
Cost saving by consuming mugaiwa
instead of breakfast or roller meal as % of
household income
20.31% 7.43% -
Remaining household income after
purchasing mealie meal requirement (ZK)
18,423 27,205 32,269
Notes:  1. Assumed household size is 6 persons, 2. Estimated mealie meal consumption is 7 kg
per person per month, 3. Lusaka income based on CSO Living Conditions Monitoring Survey,
1998, 4. Lusaka mugaiwa prices are estimated by adding milling charges to the maize grain retail
price (source: AMIC), adjusted for inflation (source: CSO) 
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Table 2.  Stated Willingness of Consumers in Maputo to
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Energy (kcal) 334    341     343   
Protein (g) 8.0  9.3   10.0 
Fat (g) 0.5  3.5   4.0 
Calcium (mg) 6.0  7.0   12.0 
Iron (mg) 1.1  2.0   2.5 
Thiamine
(mg)
0.14 0.3   0.35
Riboflavin
(mg)
   0.05  0.08  0.13
Niacin (mg)    1.0   1.8  2.0 
Vit. C (mg) 0     3.0  3.0 
Source: Food Composition Table, Technical Centre for
Agriculture and Rural Cooperation, Wageningen Agricultural
University, The Netherlands
Consumers in Maputo were asked in 1994 what
products they would choose under different price
scenarios, and were also asked about their actual market
purchases over the past month.  While 94% of
respondents preferred refined meals over whole meals
if the two carried the same price, 20% of consumers in
Maputo indicated that they would switch to mugaiwa if
these were discounted 20% relative to refined meals.
Those indicating they would switch at these prices had
the lowest average incomes of any group, 27% below
the sample average.  Forty-five percent of households
indicated they would not switch to mugaiwa at any
conceivable price discount, and these households had
average incomes 12% above the sample average.
Similar findings have been generated in Zimbabwe
(Rubey, Ward, and Tschirley 1997).
The nutritional value of mugaiwa is superior to
industrial meal.  Table 3 shows the nutritional
composition of mugaiwa, roller meal, and breakfast
meal.  Mugaiwa is substantially more nutritious than the
industrially milled mealie-meal because all of the germ
is retained in the meal.  Moreover, because it is less
expensive, the nutritive advantages of mugaiwa is even
more pronounced when expressed in monetary terms
The hammer mill sector in both countries has
substantial capacity, which is likely underutilized
during significant portions of each year:  Hammer
mills are found throughout both countries, in both rural
and urban areas, and produce mugaiwa. In Zambia,
until public market maize supplies dwindle towards the
end of the marketing season, hammer mills appear to
process as much maize grain as the industrial mills.
They can also produce other products such as roller and
breakfast meal by first de-hulling the maize and using
finer sieve settings.  All hammer mills provide custom
milling services for customers who bring relatively
small maize quantities to be milled.   Some hammer
mills in Zambia have also started commercial milling
and sell their product to the public. 
 
The hammer mill sector in southern cities of
Mozambique boomed during the early 1990s, due in
large part to the ready availability of yellow maize
grain from monetized food aid.  The informal marketing
and hammer milling sector played a major role during
the 1992 drought maintaining affordable food prices for
consumers (Figure 3): while white maize and meals
nearly disappeared from the market and their prices
skyrocketed,  yellow grain  and yellow  mugaiwa wereFSII Policy Synthesis No. 66
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Figure 3.  Retail Prices of Various Maize Products 
In Maputo Markets Before, During, and after 1992 
Drought (US$/kg)
consistently available throughout the south at affordable
prices which actually declined over the course of the
drought.
Indications from a recent survey are that the hammer
milling sector has declined in southern cities over at
least the past year, while it has maintained itself or even
expanded in the center of the country.  The reasons for
this apparent decline are being researched in
combination with the impacts of the value-added tax
mentioned earlier.
Hammer millers’ fees in both countries for grinding
maize grain into mugaiwa are substantially less than
large-scale commercial millers’ costs of milling maize
into roller and breakfast meal plus the packaging and
retailing costs incurred on these kinds of maize meal.
Because of this, consumers buying maize grain and
milling it into mugaiwa at a local  hammer mill pay
only about 60% to 80% of the cost of purchasing
breakfast or roller meal in retail stores.
Hammer mills are important to many urban and rural
consumers’ food security.  About 80% of rural
households’ total maize and maize meal purchases in
Zambia is in the form of maize milled into mugaiwa;
the remaining purchases are in the form of packaged
industrial meal. This implies that most rural consumers
prefer to satisfy their remaining
maize needs by purchasing
maize grain and having this
grain hammer milled into
mugaiwa rather than purchase
relatively expensive roller or
breakfast meal. Urban
consumption of mugaiwa is also
known to be important,
particularly for low-income
consumers.  However, during
times when the availability of
maize grain through the small-
scale public market distribution
channels is constrained, i.e.,
nearly every year during the
lean season and also when
national maize shortages occur,
industrial mills have traditionally been able to import
maize, or have preferential access to government-
imported maize, resulting in a temporary increase of the
market share for industrial mealie meal versus hammer
meal.  
RECOMMENDATIONS:  If mugaiwa consumption
through the availability of maize grain and custom
milling services is to be facilitated, policy in each
country must avoid disrupting the ability of informal
traders to obtain grain from the lowest cost source.  In
Zambia, government should seriously consider
allowing the private sector to handle all needed imports.
If government chooses, instead, to continue its
involvement in imports, its most important steps would
be to ensure that its announced intentions are realistic
and feasible and that its actions are then fully
transparent to the private sector.  If government decides
to subsidize the sale of its imported grain below what
the private sector could sell it for, then it must also
supply some quantity of grain through the small and
medium scale trading, milling and public market
distribution channels during those months of the season
when local small-scale supplies normally “dry up.” If
government does not do this, the informal sector will be
unable to compete with large industrial millers
receiving the subsidized grain, and consumers will be
unable to access cheap grain and mugaiwa.                      FSII Policy Synthesis No. 66  
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These efforts should not be restricted to large urban
centers, and should include the rural maize trade and
hammer milling sector. The proposed Crop Marketing
Authority may be able to play a useful role in this
respect.
For future deficit seasons, Zambia can increase poor
households’ real incomes by channeling part of its
intended maize imports through small and medium
scale traders and small-scale commercial mills.  
The Food Reserve Agency in Zambia performed a retail
function several years ago, as has the Grain Marketing
Board (GMB) in Zimbabwe. The latter set up small
sales offices at their depots, following which an active
market developed for GMB grain to be milled by small
traders and millers who would sell it in urban and small
town markets in the form of mugaiwa. Other millers
stacked the maize that they bought from GMB depots
outside their mills, and allowed consumers to buy the
grain and then custom mill it for a fee.  Similar
marketing practices have been witnessed at Soweto
markets in Lusaka,  and illustrate that consumer
demand for low-cost food is substantial.  
In Mozambique, policy has generally been quite
favorable for the informal marketing and hammer
milling sectors.  Management of monetized food aid
during the 1992 drought is a clear success story
showing how markets can reduce the cost and increase
the effectiveness of emergency response.  The country
has maintained an open border policy on both exports
and imports of maize since that time.  However, the
application of the VAT to maize imports may currently
be limiting the informal sector’s ability to import maize
grain when needed, and may be raising staple food
prices to low income consumers in southern cities.
Government needs to review this policy, starting with
a clear understanding of the effects that it has had on
marketing and availability of maize grain and mugaiwa.
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